Trade liberalization in environmental goods is high on the agenda of the current Doha round. We examine its effects in a model with one domestic downstream polluting firm and two upstream firms (one domestic, one foreign). The domestic government sets the emission tax rate after the outcome of R&D is known. The upstream firms offer their technologies to the downstream firm at a flat fee. The effect of liberalization on the domestic upstream firm's R&D incentive is ambiguous. Liberalization usually results in cleaner production, which allows the country to reach higher welfare. However this increase in welfare is typically achieved at the expense of the environment. Thus our results cast doubt on the hoped-for "win-win-win" outcome of trade liberalization in environmental goods. 
Introduction
While the trade liberalization of the past sixty years has brought great bene…ts in terms of economic growth, recent research suggests it may have harmed the environment. 1 However, surely trade liberalization in environmental goods and services, making cleaner technologies more widely available especially in developing countries, must be good for the environment? This was the thinking at the fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference at Doha in November 2001 (WTO, 2001) , where "with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment", the conference agreed to negotiations on "the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to environmental goods and services". It instructed the Committee on Trade and Environment to give particular attention to "those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would bene…t trade, the environment and development". This idea of a "win-win-win" solution is also strongly promoted by the OECD (2003, 2005) .
In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of trade liberalization in environmental goods and services (EGS) on a country's eco-industry, its welfare and its environmental quality. Our analysis is especially relevant for developing countries where the demand for EGS is fast expanding while the domestic sector is still immature 2 and tari¤s on EGS are relatively high (OECD, 2005) .
We consider a vertical industry model where the downstream good's production is polluting and the upstream industry is engaged in R&D to develop a pollution abatement technology which it can sell to the downstream …rm for a license fee. The 1 Antweiler et al. (2001) …nd that trade liberalization has generally reduced SO2 concentrations. Benarroch and Thille (2001) show how the presence of transboundary pollution can improve the potential for trade by enhancing the scope of specialization between countries. Cole and Elliott (2003) suggest trade liberalization will reduce Biochemical Oxygen Demand, but increase CO2 and NOx emissions. Managi et al. (2009) , treating trade and income as endogenous, conclude that trade has bene…ted the environment in OECD countries, but increased SO2 and CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries. Kellenberg (2009) …nds that a large part of a country's success in attracting FDI from the US can be attributed to weakening environmental regulation.
2 OECD (2005) predicts that the EGS market will grow by less than 1% in developed countries and by 8.6% in the developing countries. According to Hamwey (2005) , in 2003 nearly 80% of the global exports of EGS originated in developed countries, showing the dominance of the industrialized world in this sector.
upstream …rm faces competition with a foreign …rm under the free trade regime.
We …nd that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the incentive for the domestic …rm to do R&D is ambiguous. Trade liberalization usually leads to the availability of cleaner technologies and higher welfare. However, this increase in welfare comes at the expense of the environment. The government responds to the opportunity for cleaner production by allowing more production, to the point where total pollution increases.
Thus we cast doubt on the "win-win-win" outcome that the WTO and OECD hope for: there seems to be a "win" for welfare, but not for environmental quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review of the relevant literature followed. After describing the model in 3, we solve the game by backwards induction. In Section 4 we analyze how the upstream …rms set their technology fees under di¤erent possible R&D outcomes. In Section 5, we look at government policy in the di¤erent scenarios. Section 6 discusses the R&D decisions of the …rms following which we carry out a detailed comparison of the two R&D regimes. In Sections 7 and 8, respectively, a comparison of the expected pollution damage and welfare under the two regimes for the di¤erent Nash equilibria is carried out. Section 9 concludes.
Literature review
The literature on innovation and adoption of new abatement technology, reviewed by Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a) , has mostly assumed that if a polluting …rm wants to install a new abatement technology, it has to pay a certain installation or (possibly) R&D cost itself. Some authors take into account that one …rm can license its invention to other …rms. In the papers by Milliman and Prince (1989) , Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995), Fischer et al. (2003) , the innovator is one of the polluting …rms. In other papers, which we will discuss now, there are specialized …rms (the eco-industry) that licence their innovations to the polluting industry. In all these papers, and in contrast to our paper, the polluting industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Finally, we will review the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. Parry (1995 Parry ( , 1998 ) sets up a model with free entry into the eco-industry. The probability that a given …rm will …nd (and obtain a patent for) the new technology is decreasing in the number of eco-…rms. Parry (1995) argues that when the government sets the emission tax rate before the eco-…rms'entry decision, the tax rate will usually be below marginal damage. This is to counter monopoly pricing by the innovator, excessive entry into the eco-industry and the excess of innovator revenue over social bene…ts if marginal damage is increasing in emissions. Parry (1998) compares emission taxes, tradable emission permits and relative standards, but only at their respective Pigouvian levels. La¤ont and Tirole (1996) argue that the monopolistic innovator will set a licence fee that slightly undercuts the permit price (e¤ectively an emission tax) set by the regulator. If the regulator sets the permit price after the R&D outcome, she will set it equal to zero in order to obtain complete di¤usion of the clean technology. As a result, the innovator's license fee income will be zero, so that he will not invest in R&D. Although the timing of our game is similar to La¤ont and Tirole's (1996), we do not encounter the problem of incomplete di¤usion, because there is only one …rm to which the innovators license their technology. Denicolò (1999) compares emission taxes and tradable emission permits in a model with a single eco-…rm that can invest in making its technology cleaner. Denicolò (1999) …nds that that taxes and permits are equivalent when they are set after the eco-…rm's investment. The instruments are not equivalent when they are set before the eco-…rm's investment, however both instruments lead to underinvestment in R&D. Requate (2005b) compares emission taxes and tradable permits set under di¤erent timings in a model where the monopolistic eco-…rm can invest to increase his probability of …nding the cleaner technology. He …nds that for a given timing, emission taxes always outperform permits, with commitment to a tax contingent on R&D success performing the best. The timing in our game corresponds to Requate's (2005b) timing C: after the R&D outcome is observed, but before the eco-…rms set their licence fees.
We now turn to the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. The papers we discuss here (unlike those discussed above and our own paper) all model the eco-industry's product as an input into production, in the sense that the more the downstream …rm uses of it, the lower its emissions. 3 When there are multiple eco-…rms, they are assumed to produce a homogeneous environmental good from the polluting …rm's point of view (although production costs could di¤er between eco-…rms). These papers usually do not consider the eco-industry's R&D incentives. Our paper, on the other hand, assumes that the eco-industry provides an abatement technology, which the downstream …rm can either use (against a fee) or not use, and we analyze the eco-industry's R&D incentives.
Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) consider an (otherwise symmetric) international
Cournot duopoly with an eco-…rm in the home country supplying both downstream …rms. Unlike in our model, Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) assume that the price of its product is exogenously given. The authors …nd that if the eco-…rm bene…ts from a higher tax rate, the home goverment will set a higher tax rate than the foreign government. The home government may also lower its tax rate when there is learning by doing.
Greaker (2006) shows how a country can increase the export market share of its (perfectly competitive) polluting industry by committing to a low level of allowed emissions per …rm. This is because stricter environmental policy leads more …rms to pay the initial R&D costs to enter the eco-industry (possibly also helped by technology spillovers). This increased competition in the eco-industry lowers the price of the environmental good.
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) employ a two-country model with an eco-…rm in each country, supplying the perfectly competitive polluting industries in both countries. The governments move …rst, setting a maximum emissions-to-output ratio and a subsidy for R&D with which the eco-…rm tries to reduce the marginal cost of producing its environmental good. The authors …nd that a more stringent environmental policy is good for the domestic polluting industry, because it reduces the price of abatement equipment. However, the increase in demand from the domestic polluting industry may bene…t the foreign eco-…rm at the expense of the domestic eco-…rm.
Canton (2007) considers a framework similar to Greaker and Rosendahl's (2008) , but with governments committing to an emission tax rate and di¤erent assumptions on the ownership of the eco-…rms. With Northern shareholders owning an eco-…rm in both countries, the Southern government sets its tax rate lower than its Northern counterpart, and lower than marginal damage, to reduce the revenue of the foreign-owned eco-…rm. With Southern shareholders owning a rival …rm (with higher production costs) in both countries, and with each eco-…rm's production increasing in the tax rate, the Southern government sets a lower tax rate than in the cooperative outcome.
This is because as an importer of EGS, it is trying to lower its price, and because it is only considering the positive e¤ect of a higher tax rate on Southern-owned eco-…rms.
For the North, as an exporter of EGS, the comparison of the tax rates is ambiguous.
In a framework similar to Canton (2007) but with a monopolistic Northern eco-…rm, Nimubona (2008) shows that an import tari¤ on EGS helps the Southern government to extract rents from the Northern eco-…rm. An exogenous decrease in the tari¤ leads to a lower emission tax in the South if the South cannot fully extract the eco-…rm's rents. While EGS imports rise, the decrease in the tax rate results in higher production, so that pollution may actually increase. We also …nd that while trade liberalization usually increases the expected cleanliness of production, but when it does, it also increases pollution. However, our model is quite di¤erent in that we model EGS as a technology, we assume there is a Southern eco-…rm, and we model trade liberalization as a discrete jump from autarky to completely free trade rather than a marginal reduction in the tari¤.
In the literature we see evidence of R&D incentive and productivity increasing with the adoption of trade liberalization policy which suggests that liberalization could be bene…cial for the domestic industry. 4 However, none of these studies have taken into consideration the implications of trade liberalization and R&D incentive in the context 4 Alvarez and Lopez (2005) …nd empirical evidence where …rms pursue strategies to boost their productivity to increase their chances of entering export markets when undergoing trade liberalization. Baradhan and Kletzer (1984) …nds that the protection of the more capital-intensive sector causes a fall in labour productivity, while imposition of a tari¤ on the output of the more labor-intensive sector increases productivity. Rutherford and Tarr (2002) shows that additional intermediate input varieties leads to higher growth and welfare gains from trade liberalization. Ederington and McCalman (2008) …nds that trade has a positive impact on productivity through the speeding up of the new technological adoption by domestic …rms.
of environmental pollution and abatement or EGS and whether liberalization will be instrumental in reducing the pollution.
Thus, although there have been signi…cant attempts to shed light on the topic of pollution abatement technology and R&D incentive and environmental pollution, none of these studies have taken into consideration the e¤ects of trade liberalization on the R&D incentives of pollution abatement technology which forms the main basis of this paper.
The model
We consider the market for a consumption good, for which domestic demand is given by P = A q, with P the product price, q production and A > 0. There is one domestic producer of the good (the downstream …rm), with constant marginal cost of production c: We will normalize A c = 1; so that:
and consumer surplus C is:
There is no international trade in this good. Production of the good is polluting.
Environmental damage of emissions E is:
The emissions-to-output ratio e depends on the abatement technology that the downstream …rm is using. If it does not use any abatement technology, e is normalized to one. The downstream …rm can also use an abatement technology that an upstream …rm has developed, for a ‡at fee F .
The domestic (foreign) upstream …rm has an abatement technology available with e = e h (e f ); with e f < e h < 1; i.e. the foreign …rm's technology is more e¢ cient. Both …rms can do R&D into a new technology with e = e n ; e n < e f . The cost of R&D is R and the probability of …nding the new technology is p. Environmental policy consists of an emission tax. The domestic government sets the tax rate at the level that maximizes domestic welfare.
We compare the regimes of autarky A and free trade T . With autarky, the domestic downstream …rm cannot use the technology from the foreign upstream …rm; with free trade it can. 5 The game under autarky A is as follows:
1. The domestic upstream …rm decides whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome of R&D is observed.
2. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic upstream …rm sets the technology fee.
4. The downstream …rm decides which abatement technology to use and sets its output level.
The game under free trade T is:
1. The domestic and foreign upstream …rms decide whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome of R&D is observed.
3. The domestic and foreign upstream …rms set their technology fees.
License fee and output decisions
In this section, we will solve for stages 3 and 4 of the game, introducing some constraints we will have to impose on the parameters. 5 We assume the downstream …rm cannot make an imperfect imitation of the abatement technologies itself (Parry, 1995 (Parry, , 1998 .
Using backwards induction, we start the analysis in stage 4. For stages 2 to 4, there are several scenarios s; to be de…ned later in this subsection. The downstream …rm's pro…t gross of the license fee in scenario s with technology i is, from (1):
Di¤erentiating (4) and solving for q s i :
In order to avoid complications with corner solutions, we wish to restrict our analysis such that q s 2 > 0: In subsections 5.1 and 5.2.1, we will see that q s 2 > 0 always holds under autarky as well as in free trade scenarios nf and nn for:
In subsection 5.2.2, we will see that q s 2 > 0 always holds under free trade scenarios f h and nh for:
Substituting (5) into (4), we get the gross pro…t of the downstream …rm as:
Moving on to stage 3, denote the upstream …rm with the most (least) e¢ cient technology e 1 (e 2 ) by …rm 1 (2), i.e. e 1 e 2 . Firms 1 and 2 engage in price competition to sell their technology to the downstream …rm. In autarky, the domestic upstream …rm is always …rm 1 and there is no …rm 2.
In equilibrium, …rm 1 will charge a fee of
Firm 2 will charge a fee of 0. Strictly speaking, the downstream …rm will then be indi¤erent between the technology o¤ered by …rm 1 and the technology o¤ered by …rm 2 (with free trade) or no abatement technology (in autarky). We assume that the …rm will choose …rm 1's technology. This is because …rm 1 could always charge slightly less than F s in (9) to make the downstream …rm prefer its technology.
The net pro…t s of the downstream …rm (net of the license fee for the e¢ cient technology) is then:
We will see in Section 5 that the licence fee is …rst increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the superior technology e 1 : From (8) and (9), we can write:
An improvement in the best technology on o¤er (a decrease in e 1 ) has two e¤ects on the licence fee. First, for a given tax rate, it increases the pro…ts the downstream …rm can obtain and thus raises the fee. This is the …rst term on the RHS of (11). Secondly, the tax rate changes. The e¤ect on F s is given by the second term on the RHS of (11),
Initially, the tax rate might increase as the technology gets better, as we will see in (16) . This would cause a further increase in the fee. However, eventually the tax rate will start to decline, which has a negative e¤ect on the fee. Eventually, the second e¤ect dominates as the tax rate and the fee decline to zero.
We restrict our analysis to a level of abatement technology such that the license fee is decreasing in e i : dF s =de 1 < 0: If instead dF s =de 1 < 0; the upstream …rm would realize that it could gain a higher fee with a worse technology. This would give the …rm an incentive to tinker with or sabotage the technology, increasing its e i and gaining a higher licence fee. Anticipating the analysis from Section 5, Figure 1 shows the admissible values of e n and e h under the constraint dF s =de 1 < 0 for di¤erent values of (note that e f must be between e n and e h ). For a given value of ; say ; e h and e n must be between the" = " curve and the 45-degree line e n = e h . Some curves stop at e h values less than one. These are the maximum e h values according to (7) .
Finally, let us de…ne the scenarios. In autarky, the scenarios are n0 and h0 when the domestic upstream …rm has and has not found the new technology, respectively.
In both scenarios, the downstream …rm chooses to use the domestic upstream …rm's technology. With free trade, the scenarios with their equilibrium outcomes are:
The feasible set of e_n and e_h with different lambdas Then the foreign …rm will supply the technology e f to the downstream …rm.
nh : Only the foreign …rm has found the new technology. The foreign …rm will supply the technology e n to the downstream …rm.
nf : Only the domestic …rm has found the new technology. The domestic …rm will supply the technology e n to the downstream …rm.
nn : Both …rms have found the new technology. They compete the fee down to zero. The domestic …rm is indi¤erent between the two upstream …rms'o¤ers.
Government Policy
In the second stage, the goverment sets the emission tax rate that maximizes domestic welfare W s in scenario s; given that the domestic …rm uses the most e¢ cient technology e 1 . Social welfare is the sum of the domestic upstream and domestic downstream …rms' pro…ts, consumer surplus (2) and tax revenues, minus environmental damage (3):
Two con ‡icting forces are at work when the government sets the tax rate. On the one hand the government wants to tax pollution, because there is too much of it. This is the overriding concern when e 1 is high, resulting in a positive tax rate. On the other hand, it wants to subsidize the downstream …rm's production, because there is too little of it, due to monopoly power. The government cannot subsidize production directly, therefore it lowers the pollution tax instead. When e 1 is low, the government is more worried about underproduction than about pollution, so it sets a negative tax rate. In the following, we will exclude from our analysis values of e 1 so low that t becomes negative. Indeed, as we have seen in Section 4, we will even exclude higher e 1 values for which t is positive, but the licence fee is increasing in e 1 :
Autarky
Denote the domestic upstream …rm's technology in stage 3 by e i ; i = h; n: With
i by (10) . Substituting this, (5) and (8) into (12) , social welfare in scenario i0 is given by:
Di¤erentiating and solving for t i0 yields:
The tax rate is positive if and only if:
Di¤erentiating the tax rate with respect to e i ; we …nd:
The RHS is negative for high values of and e i ; but positive for low enough values of e i : Thus as abatement technology improves (e i declines), the tax rate may …rst increase, but will eventually decrease in the quality of the technology. It is easily seen that the e¤ective tax rate on output t i0 e i is always increasing in e i0 :
Substituting (14) into (5) and (8), we get the equilibrium output and pro…ts as:
In order to avoid corner solutions, we would like q i0 0 to be positive. In Appendix 10.1 we will see that q i0 0 > 0 as long as < A 0 as de…ned in (6) . From (17) we get emissions as:
Substituting (14) and (17) into (13) we get the welfare under autarky as:
Substituting (14) into (5), we see that output without any abatement technology would be: Substituting (18) and (22) into (9), we get the technology fee as: (where A 0 is de…ned in (6)). As explained in Section 4, while the fee is …rst increasing and then decreasing in e i ; we will impose dF i0 h =de i < 0: The condition dF i0 h =de i < 0 is binding for i = n; because it is clear from Figure 2 that when dF n0 h =de n < 0; then dF h0 h =de h < 0 as well, since e h > e n : We solved dF In scenarios nk; k = f; n; the domestic upstream …rm supplies the technology. 6 Substituting e 1 = e n ; e 2 = e k and nk + F nk h = nk n by (10), along with (5) and (8) into (12) , social welfare in scenario nk is:
Di¤erentiating and solving for t nk yields:
Substituting this into (8) and (4), we get the equilibrium outputs and pro…ts as:
From (26), we get emissions as:
Substituting (25) and (26) into (24); we …nd welfare as:
For scenario nf; substituting (25) into (5), we …nd the equilibrium output of the downstream …rm when it uses the less e¢ cient technology e f :
e f e 2 n + e n + e f 2e n ( e 2 n + 1)
It is easily seen that by (15) , q 
Substituting (27) and (31) into (9), the domestic upstream …rm's licence fee is:
For scenario nn; we have F nn h = 0 and; nn = nn n as given by (27) , so that nn + F (23) with i = n; we see that the only di¤erence lies in the alternative technology e 2 which is e f < 1 in scenario nf and e = 1 in n0:
At the point where dF n0 h =de n = 0; we must have dt n0 =de n > 0 by (11) . Then since E 2 is lower in scenario nf than in n0; dF nf h =de n < 0 at the point where dF n0 h =de n = 0 and dF nf h =de n = 0 occurs at a lower value of e n than dF n0 h =de n = 0: Thus as long as dF n0 h =de n < 0; then dF nf h =de n < 0 also.
Domestic …rm has not found the new technology
In scenarios jh; j = f; n, the foreign …rm supplies the technology to the downstream …rm. Substituting e 1 = e j ; e 2 = e h ; F jh h = 0 and jh = jh h (by (10)) along with (5) and (8) into (12) , social welfare in scenario jh is:
The denominator on the RHS is positive, because it is the second order condition for welfare maximization. Thus t jh > 0 holds in the welfare optimum if and only if:
Substituting (34) into (5), we …nd the output of the downstream …rm when using the less e¢ cient technology e h : q jh h = e j 3e j e h + e 
Note that q jh j > 0 since q jh j > q jh h > 0 by (7) and e j < e h : From (37), we get emissions as: 
Substituting (34) and (37) into (33) we …nd welfare as: when the foreign …rm has technology e j ; j = f; n, and the domestic …rm has technology e h = 0:8:
Substituting (36) into (8) and (10), we get the dowstream …rm's net pro…t (after paying the license fee) as
e j 3e j e h + e (41) into (9), we get the technology fee as:
e j 3e j e h + e (42) Figure 3 shows the fee as a function of e j for di¤erent values of with e h = 0:8. The fee is …rst increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the foreign …rm's technology, for reasons explained in subsection 4. As also explained in subsection 4, we will restrict ourselves to values of e n for which the fee is increasing in the quality of the technology.
We solved dF jh f =de j = 0 from (42) numerically for di¤erent values of : The results are shown in Figure 1 as the increasing branches of the curves. given by (42) with j = f; n:
6 R&D decisions
Autarky
In autarky, the domestic …rm will undertake R&D if its expected payo¤ from undertaking R&D exceeds its payo¤ from not doing R&D:
Thus the …rm will do R&D if and only if:
with F i0 h ; i = n; h; given by (23) . R Table 1 shows the payo¤ matrix for the domestic and foreign upstream …rms in stage one, depending on either …rm's decision whether or not to do R&D. The …rst term in each cell shows the payo¤ to the domestic …rm and the second term shows the payo¤ to the foreign …rm.
Free trade

Comparing the domestic and foreign …rm' s threshold to do R&D
Let us …rst look at the foreign …rm's incentive to do R&D. In case the domestic …rm does R&D, the foreign …rm will do R&D when:
f is positive by our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.2.2, that F jh f is decreasing in e j ; j = n; f:
In case the domestic …rm does not do R&D, the foreign …rm will not do R&D when:
f is positive by our assumption that F jh f is decreasing in e j ; j = n; f: It is easily seen from (44) and (45) that when the domestic …rm does R&D the critical R&D cost level for the foreign …rm is lower:
The reason for this is that without domestic R&D, the foreign …rm can always increase its fee from F or not (then the domestic …rm's technology is better). Now we turn to the domestic upstream …rm's incentive to do R&D. If the foreign …rm does R&D, the domestic …rm will undertake R&D when:
h is positive by our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.2.1, that F nf h is decreasing in e n < e f .
In case the foreign …rm does not do R&D, the domestic …rm does not do R&D for:
h is positive by our assumption that F nf h is decreasing in e n < e f . It is easily seen from (47) and (48) that for the domestic …rm as well, its critical R&D cost level is lower if the rival …rm does R&D:
The reason is analogous to the reason behind inequality (46). 
It is unclear in general whether
which is what we shall assume from now on. Combining (50) with (44), (45), (47) and (48) yields:
Thus the domestic …rm's R&D incentive is larger than the foreign …rm's incentive.
One might think that this would always hold, because F 
Equilibria
Combining (51) with (46) and (49) yields:
It then follows that there are equilibria (R&D, R&D) when R < R 
The RHS of (53) is positive by (50) and less than one because of our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.2.2, that F jh f is decreasing in e j ; j = f; n:
Domestic …rm' s R&D incentive
We know from subsection 6.2 that the domestic …rm will do R&D in the free trade equilibrium if and only if R < R (19) for i = h; n:
( e 2 i + 1)
The inequality follows from (15) . Thus, in this case as well, expected pollution damage under free trade is greater than under autarky.
No R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are E h0 from (19) with i = h. With trade, emissions are E nn = E nf from (28) if R&D by the domestic …rm is successful and E jh ; j = f; n from (39) if it is not. We know from from subsection 7.2 that E nn = E nf > E h0 and from Appendix 10.4 that E jh > E h0 with j = f; n: Therefore we can conclude that expected polltution damage under free trade is always greater than the damage under autarky.
R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are E n0 if R&D is successful and E h0 if it is not. E i0 for i = h; n is given by (19) . With trade, emissions are E f h from (39) with j = f: Thus:
Solving for p; we see that the pollution damage under free trade is greater than under autarky for:
When p E exceeds the maximum value of p from (53), environmental damage under free trade will be greater than under autarky. When p E < p ; damage will be greater 7 D XY and D X denote expected damage under trade and autarky, respectively, with X (Y ) the R&D choice of the domestic (foreign) …rm. X; Y = R; N where R (N ) means (no) R&D. The same notation is used for W in Section 8. 8 The numerator on the RHS is positive, as we know from Appendix 10.4. The denominator is positive, because E n0 > E h0 as we have seen in subsection 7.2.
under free trade when p < p E and greater under autarky when p E < p < p . However the latter case occurs for a very limited range of parameters only: Setting p at its maximum value p from (53) for instance, and e n at its minimum value (because (54) is increasing in e n ), we …nd D R > D N N for the following set of parameter values: when = 4; e n = 0:72; e h = 0:8; for 0:798 < e f < 0:8 when = 7; e n = 0:57; e h = 0:82; for 0:81 < e f < 0:82 when = 8; e n = 0:54; e h = 0:85; for 0:79 < e f < 0:85
Thus for most parameter values within the feasible range, expected pollution damage is higher under free trade than under autarky.
R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are E n0 if R&D is successful and E h0 if it is not. E i0 for i = h; n is given by (19) . With trade, emissions are E nf from (28) if the domestic …rm's R&D is successful and E f h from (39) with j = f if it is not. Since E n0 = E nf ; we have:
We have already shown in subsection 7.1 that E f h > E h0 : Thus we …nd, again, that pollution is higher under free trade than in autarky.
R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are E n0 if R&D is successful and E h0 if it is not. E i0 for i = h; n is given by (19) . With trade, emissions are E nn = E nf = E n0 from (28) if R&D by the domestic …rm is successful and E jh ; j = f; n from (39) if it is not. Thus we have:
In subsection 7.1 we have seen that E jh > E h0 for j = f; n:
Expected pollution damage is larger with trade than in autarky.
Discussion
We can conclude that for all Nash equilibria except [R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade], expected pollution damage is unambiguously greater under free trade. Paradoxically, these are also the equilibria where trade liberalization leads to a cleaner technology becoming available to the downstream …rm. However, the government takes this opportunity for cleaner production to increase welfare (as we will see in the next section) at the expense of the environment. It reduces the e¤ective tax rate te 1 on output, prompting the …rm to produce more and ultimately even to pollute more.
The result is similar to the rebound e¤ect in energy economics, as introduced by Khazzoom (1980) and reviewed by Binswanger (2001) and Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2007) : The introduction of a more energy-e¢ cient technology (e.g. a more economical car engine) leads to an increase in demand which partly o¤sets the potential energy saving. Empirically, the rebound e¤ect is generally between 5 and 50% (Binswanger, 2001) , so that there is still a net saving from more e¢ cient technology. In our model, however, there is a political rebound e¤ect of more than 100%, so that cleaner technology leads to more pollution. For future reference, it will be useful here to consider the more general case where under free trade the foreign …rm supplies the technology e j; where j = f; n:
Comparing welfare under autarky (20) 
In Appendix 10.5 we show that dW jh =de j < 0 for e j e h : The better the technology that the foreign …rm supplies, the higher domestic welfare. It follows that welfare under free trade is greater than under autarky.
No R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W h0 from (20) is not. Therefore:
The …rst inequality follows from R < R 
The …rst inequality follows from R < R if it is not. W i0 for i = h; n is given by (20) . With trade, welfare is W f h from (40) with j = f: Thus:
Solving for p, we see that for welfare under free trade to be higher than under autarky:
When p w exceeds the maximum value of p from (53), the expected welfare under free trade will be greater than under autarky. When p w < p , expected welfare will be greater under free trade when p < p w and greater under autarky when p w < p < p : It can be shown that p w can be positive for the lowest possible value of R (R 2 h from (48)) and it can be below p for the highest possible value of R (R A h from (43)). Thus we see that in this equilibrium, welfare could be higher under free trade or under autarky.
R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W (24) if the domestic …rm's R&D is successful and W f h R from (33) with j = f if it is not.
Thus:
The second equality follows from W n0 = W nf :
We know from subsection 8.1 that W f h > W h0 . Thus we conclude that expected welfare is higher under free trade than under autarky.
R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W 
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the e¤ects of trade liberalization in environmental goods and services (EGS) on a country's domestic eco-…rm, on pollution and on welfare.
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on the domestic eco-…rm's R&D incentive is ambiguous. The R&D incentive increases with trade if the domestic …rm's existing technology is relatively clean (so that its R&D incentive under autarky is low) and the foreign eco-…rm's existing technology is not too clean (so that the domestic …rm's R&D incentive with trade is high). If the domestic …rm does R&D under autarky, but neither …rm undertakes R&D with trade, liberalization may decrease welfare. Thus it may be best for a developing country to …rst liberalize trade in environmental goods with similar countries whose environmental technologies are not too much better than its own. This will stimulate R&D by its domestic eco-industry, increasing welfare and putting the eco-…rm in a better position to face competition from more advanced eco-…rms at a later date.
Although trade liberalization means that cleaner technologies become available, it generally leads to an increase in pollution. This is because the government takes the op- If the eco-industry would invent a technology that was much cleaner than the existing technologies, pollution would decline. However, the eco-industry does not have any incentive to undertake R&D into a very clean technology, or even to market it if it is available. This is because when a very clean technology is available, pollution is not a pressing problem anymore and the government will set a negative environmental tax rate to stimulate production. Thus the eco-industry would not be able to make any money from its invention.
The problem of negative tax rates is particularly severe in our model, because there is just one polluting …rm which would like to produce much less than the welfaremaximizing amount. If the industry were more competitive, there would be less need for negative taxes and more incentive for R&D into cleaner technologies. However, for very clean technologies, the tax rate and the license fee would still be decreasing in the cleanliness of the technology, discouraging the eco-industry from R&D into such technologies.
We have seen that welfare usually increases with trade liberalization and generally changes in the same direction as pollution. If trade liberalization increases pollution as well as welfare, one might argue that the increase in pollution is nothing to worry about, because environmental damage is just an element of social welfare, which is increasing overall. However, particularly in developing countries, governments might not value the environment enough and the increase in pollution might reduce welfare, especially in the longer run. It is easily seen that G = 0 for e f = e n and G > 0 for e f = e h : It can be shown that G can only be negative if it is decreasing in e f at e f = e n : Renaming e n = x; e h = z; we …nd from (32) and (42) From (29) and (32), renaming e n = x; e f = y; e h = z: interior maximum (a > 0), is negative. We conclude that is negative so that the RHS of (66) is negative. The lowest possible value of (W nf F nf h ) is thus achieved at the maximum value of x; which is y: Setting x = y in (65), we obtain from (20) : 
